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GIDEON v. WAINWRIGHT
VI. Gideon v. Wainwright in Death Penalty Cases
Ronald Tabakt
I should first mention that we are going to have the death
penalty in New York State because Congress has passed a new
federal drug law that will apply in New York State.279
I want to talk about three aspects of capital litigation that
implicate Gideon. The first aspect is the quality of the defense
offered at trial. State legislatures and local counties generally do
not adequately fund defense lawyers to represent death row in-
mates. °80 Defense counsel generally get no investigative assis-
tance at all. The people who do these cases are frequently either
public defenders with incredible caseloads or are local lawyers,
some of whom are not even criminal practitioners, who get ap-
pointed to take on these cases.
These lawyers are subjected to enormous pressures from the
community, and they, unfortunately, frequently succumb to this
pressure. For example, we recently had a case in the Eleventh
Circuit, which involved a local defense lawyer who did not chal-
lenge the jury selection system even though a prima facie case of
unconstitutional racial discrimination against blacks serving on
juries could have been established.2"' When he was asked why he
had not challenged the jury selection system, he replied that the
leading defense lawyers in town had gotten together and decided
that the public would get upset at their clients if they were to
challenge racial discrimination in the selection of local juries.
Therefore, they all decided that such a challenge would do more
harm than good and they never made such a challenge. The re-
t Special Counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; J.D., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1974; Law Clerk to Hon. John F. Dooling, Jr., U.S. District Court, Eastern District
of New York, 1974-75; Outstanding Volunteer Award, The Legal Aid Society, 1984; New
York State Bar Association President's Pro Bono Service Award, 1985; American Law-
yer's Best Pro Bono Performance Award, 1986.
279. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 120 Stat. 4181 (1988).
280. See Tabak, supra note 149, at 801-04 and 810. See also Toward A More Just
and Effective System of Review In State Death Penalty Cases, A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON
DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS 70-77 (October 1989).
281. Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 353 (1989)
(holding that counsel was not ineffective and that a discrimination claim was procedur-
ally barred due to counsel's failure to object).
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sult was that our black client who was charged with raping and
killing a white woman wound up with an all-white jury, even
though blacks constituted almost thirty percent of the popula-
tion, and even though a single juror's vote against the death
penalty would have resulted in a life sentence.2"2
Death penalty cases are more complex cases not only be-
cause of the special eighth amendment constitutional rules in
these cases, but also because of the need to investigate and pre-
sent mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of a capital pro-
ceeding. Unfortunately, many defense lawyers do not prepare for
the penalty phase of capital cases. In one notable case, where the
lawyer was found ineffective, the lawyer was asked why, after he
put on an unsuccessful insanity defense at the guilt phase, he
did not put on anything at the sentencing phase. He said he did
not choose to "prepare for losing" the guilt phase.28 3
There are also many defense lawyers who exhibit some
rather questionable judgment. For example, defense lawyers fre-
quently make arguments in the guilt phase which are totally in-
consistent with their subsequent arguments in the penalty
phase - thereby fatally undermining their credibility before
the jury in what is often the most crucial part of the trial. Thus,
counsel who vehemently argues during the guilt phase that the
defendant did not commit the crime is unlikely to be persuasive
when he proceeds to argue soon thereafter, during the penalty
phase, that the defendant is deeply sorry for having committed
the crime.284
It is vital to learn how to counsel the defendant in a death
penalty case to take a proferred plea bargain. Attorneys with
wide experience in representing death-row inmates believe that
over half of the people on death-row today were offered and
turned down plea bargains whereby they could have gotten life
sentences. 8 5 Defense lawyers must learn how to offer proper ad-
282. Id. at 1497-98. See also Gates v. Zant, 880 F.2d 293, 293-97 (11th Cir. 1989)
(Clark, J. dissenting).
283. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533-34 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998
(1985) (due to defense counsel's ineffectiveness, the jury never heard available character
evidence in the sentencing phase).
284. See W. WHITE, supra note 148, at 55-56.
285. Telephone interview with Joseph Nursey, Team Defense Project, Atlanta, Ga.,
(Nov. 14, 1987). Indeed, Ted Bundy was executed only because he had declined an offer
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vice on plea bargains to clients whose thoughts on that issue
may be distorted by serious mental problems, lack of judgment
or an unwillingness to detract from "their macho image. "286
The need for better quality lawyers in these cases has been
recognized even by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which has de-
cried the "recurring problem" of defense counsel who "vigor-
ously" contest the State's case at the guilt phase but then do
little to challenge it at the penalty phase. 287 But so far, the
United States Supreme Court has done its best in its rulings on
ineffectiveness of counsel to limit the possibility of meaningful
relief."'8
A second major part of the problem is the lack of a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to counsel in state postconviction and
federal habeas corpus proceedings. That the provision of capable
counsel in such proceedings can be crucial is evident from the
fact that many serious constitutional violations have only been
discovered because of lawyering done, on a pro bono basis, in
such proceedings.
For example, a lawyer at my firm entered one case only af-
ter it had reached the Tenth Circuit. After investigating, he un-
covered the following: The judge who imposed the death sen-
tence at the retrial had been one of the two lawyers in the
prosecutor's office when the case was first tried. Although this
lawyer turned judge had stated at the outset of the retrial that
he had had nothing to do with the original prosecution (despite
having been asked to work on it), our paralegals found local
press reports from the time of the original trial which reported
that on several separate occasions he had commented to the
press about the case and about the prosecution's strategy. Once
that happened, that death sentence was thrown out.2 89
In another case, we found during a post conviction investi-
of a life sentence. See W. WHITE, supra note 148, at 35-36.
286. See W. WHITE, supra note 148, at 36-37.
287. State v. Williams, 480 So. 2d 721, 728 n.14 (La. 1985).
288. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright 477 U.S.
168 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
289. State v. Hatch, Nos. CR-79-302, 303, 304, 305 (Jan. 26, 1987) (Canadian Cnty.
Okla.). Unfortunately, Mr. Hatch was resentenced to death by a different judge, who
subsequently resigned from the bench after the initiation of a judicial inquiry concerning
him.
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gation that one of the jurors in the case was in a mental hospital.
It turned out that he had been mentally ill at the time he served
on the jury. He gave us an affidavit stating that he had been
biased against the defendant because he thought he had read a
story that said that the defense lawyer was having an affair with
a woman of whom he was enamored. This showing did not per-
suade the Arkansas Supreme Court that anything was wrong
with that case, but we are still working on it in federal court.29
You may remember the McCleskey291 case, the case about
racial discrimination in capital sentencing. After the Supreme
Court upheld McCleskey's death sentence, the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund went back and did further investigation in a suc-
cessor post conviction proceeding. It discovered that the State
had planted an informer in the cell next to McCleskey and had
actively solicited information from the informer long after Mc-
Cleskey had obtained counsel. This raised a substantial constitu-
tional challenge, which succeeded in the federal district court,
only to be reversed by the Eleventh Circuit - largely on the
grounds that the Legal Defense Fund should somehow have un-
covered sooner evidence of official misconduct which the State
was successfully endeavoring to hide.292
These are the kind of issues that can be developed when
you have habeas corpus proceedings in federal court. So, these
are very important proceedings. You cannot count on the state
courts to provide justice in these cases, and it is true, as Justice
Fortas commented,293 that the state courts resent the federal
courts upsetting convictions and death sentences in habeas
corpus proceedings. They resent them because the federal courts
deal with serious constitutional problems which have occurred in
the state courts and which the state courts have not corrected.
It is absolutely vital, therefore, that we oppose the recom-
mendations made by the committee chaired by Justice Powell
which would curtail the right to federal habeas corpus.294 I can
290. See Tabak, supra note 149, at 812 (discussing Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124,
128, 697 S.W.2d 872, 875 (1985)).
291. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
292. See McCleskey v. Zant, 890 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1989).
293. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
294. The recommendations of that committee (the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases of the Judicial Conference of the United States) ap-
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guarantee you that without habeas corpus, one-third to one-half
of the persons who are executed will be executed as a result of
an unconstitutional conviction or death sentence. That is the
range of death penalty cases that have been ordered retried by
the federal courts.20 5
Yet, those victories which are now being won in federal
habeas corpus actions, and in state postconviction proceedings,
are being won despite the fact that there is no constitutionally
recognized right to counsel.29 Thus, it is purely happenstance
whether you happen to get Skadden, Arps, my former firm
Hughes, Hubbard & Reed or some other capable firm to come in
and do the investigation which establishes what has happened.
Where a firm like that is not willing and able to volunteer, major
constitutional problems such as those which my firm has uncov-
ered will likely remain undetected, and people will get executed
unjustly.
The case I described above - with the judge who had re-
peatedly commented on the case on behalf of the prosecutor's
office - had made it all the way to the Tenth Circuit with the
trial lawyer still mishandling the case. It was only because he
was late in filing his brief in the Tenth Circuit that the court
caused him to be relieved. My firm was asked by the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund to come in, and we then did our investiga-
tion.297 This catch-as-catch-can system is not how I had under-
pointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, were introduced by Senator Thurmond late in 1989
as S. 1760, 101 Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). In March 1990, the Judicial Conference of the
United States recommended several significant changes to the Ad Hoc Committee's rec-
ommendations. Reportedly, the Judicial Conference would have recommended additional
statutory changes, to roll back certain procedural restrictions on the consideration of
death row inmates' meritorious constitutional claims, if Chief Justice Rehnquist-the
author of several Supreme Court decisions imposing such restrictions-cast votes creat-
ing ties. See Greenhouse, Vote Is A Rebuff For Chief Justice, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1990,
at A16, Col. 4.
295. See Godbold, Pro Bono Representation of Death Sentenced Inmates, 42 REC.
OF THE Ass'N. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 859, 873-74 (1987); see also Letter from
George H. Kendall, Associate Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.,
to Al Pearson, Reporter to the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
Cases (Apr. 3, 1989).
296. See Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989). There is now a statutory
right to counsel in federal habeas corpus, under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. See
supra note 279. But even effective counsel at that point may not be able to resuscitate
claims waived or poorly litigated in state postconviction proceedings.
297. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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stood Gideon to work.
Finally in this regard, there is now some progress being
made with the federal government and some state governments
helping to fund resource centers to give backup support for peo-
ple handling death penalty cases in state post conviction and
federal habeas corpus proceedings. But there are real dangers
that those resource centers will be subject to improper pressures.
In Florida the head of the office of the Capital Collateral Repre-
sentative is appointed by Governor Martinez, who ran for office
on a platform focusing on support for the death penalty and who
now signs the death warrants. In Louisiana a federal judge op-
posed funding the resource center until the person who had been
working effectively on ensuring proper representation for Louisi-
ana's death row inmates was withdrawn as the lawyer who would
head the resource center.2 98 It is vital that these resource centers
be independent in the way that The Legal Aid Society has an
independent operation, and that they not be beholden to the ju-
diciary, the governors, or the prosecutors in these states.
My final point is, that even if we have superb counsel in
state postconviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings in
every case, counsel may be meaningless in many cases because of
the developing law of procedural default. 99 I found this rather
amazing when I started to get into this area. People said the
most important thing you have to know about is procedural de-
fault. I said, "What are you talking about?" Back when I was in
law school, which was not that long ago, the rule was that if you
did not "understandingly and knowingly" waive your claim in
state court for strategic reasons, you were allowed to raise it in
federal court. 00 Well, little did I know that in the meantime,
without any act of Congress intervening, the "cause and
prejudice" test came in and even negligent lawyering was not
considered to be "cause" for the failure to raise a claim in state
court.3 0 1 What is actually happening now in this country is that
298. Conversation with Millard Farmer, Team Defense Project, Atlanta, Ga., in
Warrenton, Virginia (July 1988).
299. See, e.g., Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
300. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
301. See Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986).
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people are literally being executed because their lawyer did not
object at trial to what is an unconstitutional practice at the trial
or sentencing hearing.
How can I say that with such great ardor and evident know-
ledgeability? One reason I can is because there have been at
least two recent cases in Georgia of codefendants, where counsel
for one defendant did not object and, in a separately held pro-
ceeding, counsel for another defendant did object.3 0 2 The de-
fendants whose lawyers objected in a way that did not run afoul
of the Georgia procedural bar rule eventually were granted new
trials by the federal courts.30s The codefendants, whose lawyers
did not raise a timely objection, were unable to get the federal
courts to rule on their claims.304 In one case, that of John Eldon
Smith, this occurred even though his codefendant (and common
law wife) had already won on the identical claim in that same
federal court and had already gotten a life sentence at retrial. 0 5
Since the federal courts refused to consider Smith's claim, which
they knew they would have to grant, he was executed.06
These are about the greatest travesties that I have seen of
all the many travesties in the way in which the death penalty is
being carried out. These procedural default rulings apply in all
sorts of contexts in criminal cases, but the most ridiculous re-
sults are in the death penalty area. 07
302. See Thomas v. Kemp, 800 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1986); Stanley v. Kemp, 737
F.2d 921 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1003 (1983); Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1127 (1983).
303. Thomas v. Kemp, 800 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1986); Machetti v. Linahan, 679
F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983).
304. Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F.2d 921 (11th Cir. 1984); see Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d
1459 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
305. See Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1462 (11th Cir. 1983).
306. Id. at 1472. Compare Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983) (holding that the state jury selection procedure permitting
women to simply opt out by sending notice to the jury commissioners deprived the de-
fendant of his right to an impartial jury) with the case of Machetti's co-defendant, Smith
v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983) (holding that the
defendant waived his right to object to jury composition by failing to assert the issue at
trial); compare Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F.2d 921 (11th Cir. 1984) (claim of habeas corpus
barred and stay of execution denied) with the case of Stanley's co-defendant Thomas v.
Kemp, 800 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1986) (relief was granted in the same claim).
307. A subsequent, fatal example occurred in a 5-4 decision in a case in which I
represented the petitioner, Aubrey Dennis Adams. A new sentencing trial had been
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Thus, it is particularly obscene for Justice Powell to be as-
serting that a major problem with federal habeas corpus is that
counsel for death row inmates are abusing the courts by raising
frivolous claims in repetitive proceedings, 30 when in reality
what we have is the courts' fatal abuse of death row inmates, by
failing to review meritorious claims which were negligently
waived by trial lawyers who were not given adequate funding or
support by the courts.0 9
unanimously ordered for Adams by the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the judge had
unconstitutionally misinformed the jury by repeatedly stressing that it had no responsi-
bility for the sentencing. Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986),
modified and reh'g denied, 816 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, Dugger v. Ad-
ams, 485 U.S. 933 (1988). However, the Supreme Court, without suggesting that the
Eleventh Circuit's holding on Mr. Adams' claim had been incorrect, nevertheless re-
versed, because Adams' trial attorney had not objected and because Adams had not of-
fered an excuse for that failure which would amount to "good cause." Dugger v. Adams,
109 S. Ct. 1211, 1216-18 (1989). Thus, the Supreme Court sent "a man to a presump-
tively unlawful execution because he or his lawyers did not raise his objection at what is
felt to be the appropriate time for doing so." Id. at 1218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
308. See, e.g., Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1035, 1038-41 (1989).
309. A further problem has been injected by the Supreme Court's adoption, by judi-
cial legislation, of a new retroactivity standard in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
Under Teague other federal courts will generally be barred from granting relief on claims
which have been asserted at trial and every stage of litigation thereafter, if the basis for
granting relief is a new decision handed down after the defendant's direct appeal has
been completed. Id. at 1074. Indeed, under the Supreme Court's decisions in Butler v.
McKellar, 58 U.S.L.W. 4294 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1990), and Saffle v. Parks, 58 U.S.L.W. 4322
(U.S. Mar. 5, 1990), the federal courts will frequently be precluded from upholding a
habeas petitioner's meritorious constitutional claim if granting the claim would entail
applying an existing Supreme Court precedent in a different context. Decisions such as
Teague, Butler, and Parks are the latest manifestations of the Supreme Court's injudi-
cious campaign to eviscerate the statutorily-mandated system of federal habeas corpus.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/6
